Class Actions and State Authority by Issacharoff, Samuel
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 44
Issue 2 2012 Winter Article 2
2012
Class Actions and State Authority
Samuel Issacharoff
New York University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 369 (2012).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol44/iss2/2
2_ISSACHAROFF.DOCX 12/14/2012 3:49 PM 
 
369 
Class Actions and State Authority 
Samuel Issacharoff*  
As experiments with class actions spread to more distant shores, 
especially in countries of civil law backgrounds, a recurring question 
arises: what is the relation of the private class action to the customary 
regulatory power of the state?  The response offered here is that, in fact, 
the class action stands in three different postures to state authority: as a 
direct challenge, as a complement, and as a rival.  Recent class action 
cases in the U.S. are analyzed to examine these three functions and to 
give a distinct justification for each.  At bottom, each justification turns 
on a contested commitment to a diversity of regulatory authority—here 
termed “regulatory pluralism”—that lends coherence to all three forms 
of interaction between the state and private authority, claiming the 
mantle of the “private attorney general.” 
  
 
* Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law.  My thanks to 
Fabrizzio Cafaggi, Troy McKenzie, Arthur Miller and Emanuel Towfigh for pushing me on the 
ideas presented here, for which I bear the responsibility.  Earlier versions were presented at the 
Scuola Superiore della Pubblica Amministrazione in Rome, and at the International Conference 
of Procedural Law in Buenos Aires.  I benefitted from critical commentary at each setting.  Maria 
Ponomarenko provided indispensable research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Even as class actions spread beyond their American home medium,1 
they remain a source of contestation in every legal system.  Some of the 
disputes are over technical issues of class structure, such as whether the 
opt-out form of the American class action infringes individual 
autonomy,2 or whether the customary cost-shifting rules of continental 
legal systems should be modified to facilitate collective actions.3  In the 
hands of lawyers and judges, these technical issues come to the fore as 
contested procedural matters in the administration of collective 
litigation.  But the technical debates ill-capture the fundamental source 
of tension in class action law.  That tension, as set out below, is 
presented most acutely in civil law countries, but an examination of 
American developments shows that even the country with the most 
established class action practices is not immune. 
 
1. See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2009) (evaluating European class action reforms in light of the American 
experience with mass litigation); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation across the Atlantic 
and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (noting that European 
countries have “come to embrace civil procedure reforms to authorize aggregate litigation”).  See 
also RICARDO LUIS LORENZETTI, JUSTICIA COLECTIVA (2010) (tracing the development of 
Argentinian class actions); FRANCISCO VERBIC, PROCESOS COLECTIVOS  (2007) (setting forth the 
jurisprudential foundations in Argentine law for the development of aggregate litigation); 
LEANDRO J. GIANNINI, LA TUTELA COLECTIVA DE DERECHOS INDIVIDUALES HOMOGÉNEOS 
(2007) (developing Argentine law in context of undifferentiated individual claims); Deborah R. 
Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation 
Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 307 (2011) (“[A]t least twenty-one countries . . . have 
adopted some type of class action . . . .”); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for 
Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 326–31 (2003) (providing an overview of class 
actions in Brazil, the most developed of any civil law country); CASSIO SCARPINELLA BUENO, 
DIREITO PROCESSUAL CIVIL 197–317 (2010) (providing a systematic overview of Brazilian class 
action law and the use of the public prosecutor for organizing collective litigation); W.A. 
BOGART ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA: A NATIONAL PROCEDURE IN A MULTI-
JURISDICTIONAL SOCIETY?, GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS EXCHANGE (2007), available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Canada_National_Report.pdf 
(presenting a general overview of Canadian class action law).  
2. See, e.g., Christopher Hodges, What Are People Trying to Do in Resolving Mass Issues, 
How Is It Going, and Where Are We Headed?, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 330, 
341 (2009) (“This debate has acted as a brake on the adoption of collective action mechanisms in 
countries such as Austria, France, and Germany.”); S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the 
International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 22 
(2008) (“[C]ivil law nations interpret a class action—even with an opt-out provision—as an 
infringement on a non-representative plaintiff’s right to decide when and how to exercise his or 
her right to a cause of action.”).  See generally Remo Caponi, Collective Redress in Europe: 
Current Developments of “Class Action” Suits in Italy (2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=2100448 (discussing new Italian 
regulation on class action suits).  
3. See Gidi, supra note 1, at 340 (explaining that in Brazil, for example, unsuccessful class 
action plaintiffs are exempted from the traditional “loser pays” fee-shifting regime). 
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At its simplest, and most compelling, the class action is a centralizing 
device that overcomes a variety of collective action problems.4  This is 
clearest when the class action is directed to negative value claims whose 
potential legal merit cannot justify the transactional values of pursuing 
legal redress.5  But it is just as compelling when individual claims for 
redress arise from a broad harm whose effects are undifferentiated 
among its victims, as in the classic civil rights cases that formed the 
basis for modern Rule 23 jurisprudence.6 
When viewed as a procedural device to overcome collective action 
problems in mass society, the class action is at once most 
comprehensible and most problematic.  The simple fact is that all 
societies already possess an institution designed to overcome collective 
action barriers to common security and the proper allocation of burdens 
and resources: the state, in its most basic Hobbesian functions.7  The 
class action offers an alternative form of collective organization to the 
state—without the elements of popular participation, political consent, 
and electoral accountability that justify governmental authority in a 
democracy.  That delegation of collective authority to an institution 
without the democratic pedigree of the state demands some justification, 
especially in countries with the strong statist tradition emerging from 
Roman law. 
Ricardo Lorenzetti—the President of the Argentine Supreme Court 
and the author of the transformative opinion in Argentine 
jurisprudence—well captures the view of the class action as an 
alternative to state monopoly control on collective action in Halabi v. 
Poder Ejecutivo Nacional:8 
 
4. For example, bankruptcy proceedings provide an alternative mechanism for resolving 
aggregate claims.  See Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Non-Class Aggregate 
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 960 (2012) (“[B]ankruptcy serves as a better model for 
judging when to use, and how to order, nonclass aggregation of mass tort litigation.”). 
5. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The most compelling 
rationale for finding superiority in a class action [is] the existence of a negative value suit . . . .”).  
See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (citing favorably the fact that 
plaintiffs would have been unlikely to pursue individual claims, each averaging just $100). 
6. See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the 
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 661 (2011) (arguing that Rule 23 authors primarily 
had desegregation suits in mind when they provided for mandatory class treatment under Rule 
23(b)(2)). 
7. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (noting 
that absent the collective security afforded by the state—in the hypothesized state of nature—
“there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain”).  See also Samuel 
Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 
338 (describing “the class action mechanism as fundamentally a centralizing device designed to 
accomplish some of the same functions as performed by the state”). 
8. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice] 
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Collective actions are a great support for the institutional design of the 
country because they are mechanisms that allow civil society to 
participate in the state of law.  If ordinary citizens participate in the 
life of the country, there [are] . . . fewer centralized decisions in a 
country with a long tradition of centralized decisionmaking.9 
In some countries, the tension between state authority and the class 
action’s collective empowerment plays out in debates over entrusting 
only state-designated non-governmental organizations (NGO), such as 
registered consumer advocacy groups, to bring a class action—as in 
early legislation in Brazil and Italy.10  But, perhaps because class 
actions are by now well-rooted in American law, the debate over the 
relationship between class actions and state authority is paradoxically 
less well developed in this country. 
Following the invitation of President Lorenzetti to ground the use of 
class actions in a conception of “regulatory pluralism,” this Article will 
use the idea of multiple sources of regulatory power to explore the 
relationship between class actions and state authority.11  Class actions 
 
24/2/2009, “Halabi c. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional” Ley 25.873, decreto 1563/042/amparo ley 
16.986 (finding a right to collective action directly under the Argentine constitution and adopting 
a mechanism for prosecution of consumer class action).  For a discussion of the role of Halabi in 
establishing a procedural route for the vindication of what are termed “individual homogeneous” 
rights, in accordance with Brazilian usage, see JOSÉ MARÍA SALGADO, TUTELA INDIVIDUAL 
HOMOGÉNEA 103–11 (2011). 
9. The passage from which this English translation derives reads as follows:  
Las acciones colectivas son un gran aporte al diseño institucional del país porque son 
mecanismos que provee el Estado de Derecho para que la sociedad civil participe.  Y si 
el ciudadano común participa en la vida del país, entonces hay más control, más 
debate, hay discusión y transparencia, menos oscilaciones pendulares y más equilibrio 
de fuerzas, menos decisiones centralizadas en un país con una larga tradición de 
decisiones centralizadas. 
Ricardo Lorenzetti, La acción de clase es un aporte al diseño institucional del país, PORTAL DEL 
CONSUMIDOR PROTECTORA, http://www.protectora.org.ar/legislacion/la-accion-de-clase-es-un-
aporte-al-diseno-institucional-del-pais/1453/ (last visited June 23, 2012).    
10. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990 CÓDIGO DE PROTEÇÃO E DEFESA DO 
CONSUMIDOR [C.D.C.] [Consumer Code],  art. 82 (Braz.), translated in Gidi, supra note 1, at 406 
(limiting collective standing to government officials and public interest associations); Decreto 
Legislativo 6 Settembre 2005, n.206, in CODICE DEL CONSUMO [Consumer Code] art. 140 bis 
(It.), as discussed in Caponi, supra note 2, at 8.  On the ability of such groups to serve the role of 
consumer protection adequately, compare Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 1, at 194–97 (noting 
potential conflicts of interest between nonprofit organizations and the consumers they represent), 
with John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 288, 347 (2010) (arguing that because nonprofit organizations stake their “reputational 
capital” on the outcome of litigation, they are likely to deliver “loyal and competent 
performance”).   
11. Regulatory pluralism is generally used to connote the overlap of regulatory powers 
between formal state functions and private associations that may set professional standards or in 
other ways fill gaps in formal state coordination.  See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Rethinking Private 
Regulation in the European Regulatory Space, in REFRAMING SELF-REGULATION IN EUROPEAN 
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exist in fundamentally different relations to state power, at times as a 
direct antagonist, at times as overt or tacit ally, and at times independent 
of direct governmental involvement.  Examined through this 
framework, recent class action cases flesh out some observations about 
the political economy of non-state collective actions. 
I. THE CLASS ACTION AS A CHALLENGE TO STATE AUTHORITY 
Central to the reforms of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1966 was a desire to facilitate the successful prosecution 
of civil rights claims.12  The language and structure of Rule 23(b)(2) is 
framed in terms of the uniformity of the defendant’s treatment of a 
group of persons—what would later be framed as the cohesiveness of 
the affected class.13  That uniformity, in turn, would provide the basis 
for declaratory or injunctive relief that would condemn the defendant’s 
across-the-board conduct. 
As straightforward and compelling as this account is, it is nonetheless 
paradoxical.  It is precisely the uniformity of the conduct, as with the 
segregation of the school system in Topeka, Kansas, that makes class 
certification both proper under Rule 23(b)(2) and unnecessary.  What 
difference would it have made had Brown v. Board of Education14 gone 
forward as just an individual case brought in the name of either Oliver 
Brown, the putative lead plaintiff, or his daughter Linda Brown, the 
actually excluded schoolchild?  Any declaration of unconstitutionality, 
or even more certainly an injunction against the continued operation of 
the segregated system as to the Brown family, could not possibly have 
been confined to the Brown family’s claims alone.  Further, class 
certification might have actually worked to the disadvantage of the 
challenge to school segregation.  Were the first case to stumble in its 
theory or evidentiary presentation, res judicata would not serve as a bar 
to subsequent, better formulated challenges, unless the class were 
certified.15 
Two possible justifications for class treatment are readily apparent.  
 
PRIVATE LAW 3, 36–38 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006) (focusing on a single regulatory relationship 
as opposed to monopolistic private regulatory power).  Here, I use this term one step further to 
include the incremental regulatory effect of litigation.   
12. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 704–06 (noting that authors focused extensively on 
desegregation suits in considering various drafts of Rule 23(b)(2)). 
13. Rule 23(b)(2) reads: “The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief 
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
15. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (clarifying that class-wide suits must conform 
to the procedural requirements of Rule 23 to have preclusive effect). 
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First, class actions take pressure off the individual plaintiffs in 
politically or socially charged litigation.  For the same reason the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund chose to proceed in the name of Oliver 
Brown rather than his minor daughter, so too the fact of having many 
named plaintiffs acting on behalf of a veritable army of claimants 
diminishes the vulnerability of individual plaintiffs precisely because 
they become largely interchangeable. 
Second, and more central to the present inquiry, the anticipated scope 
of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions puts them on a collision course with the 
political choices of democratically elected governmental authority.  This 
problem is more specific than the ever-present consternations over 
countermajoritarian judicial review.  Rather, the classic civil rights class 
action directed at discriminatory state action is characterized precisely 
by a claim that the majoritarian processes have placed the class at risk 
of harm by the legislated choices of majoritarian constituencies.  On this 
view, the certification of a class conforms to the central insight of the 
renowned Carolene Products footnote four.16  The Rule 23(a) factors, 
in effect, are a proxy for the discreteness of a cohesive class of 
plaintiffs, and the Rule 23(b)(2) requirement of being subject to a 
uniformly applied policy or course of conduct establishes that the class 
is treated as distinct from the population at large—an operationalization 
of the footnote’s insularity requirement.17  The key to Rule 23(b)(2) is 
that the uniformity of treatment across the affected population defines 
the class.18  In turn, the Rule 23(a) prerequisites for class certification 
require that the group subject to distinct state conduct be substantial19 
and that the legal claim substantially addresses the asserted harm 
suffered by the entirety of the class.20  When combined, the formal 
 
16. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  In footnote four, the 
Court set out the basis for modern judicial review by suggesting that certain categories of 
legislation may be subject to more exacting scrutiny.  Id.  The Court recognized that it might at 
some point have to apply more searching review to “legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”  Id. 
In the most famous passage of the footnote, the Court added that stricter scrutiny might also apply 
when “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”  Id. 
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (the opposing party’s actions or inaction must “apply generally to 
the class”). 
18. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (holding that Rule 
23(b)(2) applies only when “conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as 
to all of the class members or as to none of them”) (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
20. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (clarifying that the common question “must be of such a nature 
that it is capable of class-wide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity 
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criteria of the rules and the resulting class definition set forth the 
discreteness and insularity of the affected population. 
Viewed in this fashion, the Rule 23(b)(2) class action is a claim of 
political disregard by the majority for the particularized interests of the 
minority.21  The final passage of the Carolene Products footnote, too 
often overlooked in favor of the evocative concepts of discreteness and 
insularity, makes this point clear: “[W]hether prejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously 
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”22 
The countermajoritarian force of the class action as a challenge to 
governmental conduct is still more apparent in a recent massive class 
action, also denominated Brown.  In Brown v. Plata,23 the Supreme 
Court confronted the most significant class action litigation of the past 
decade, yet one whose procedural contours appear so obvious as to not 
even register as a “class action case.”  At issue was the persistent 
overcrowding of California state prisons, the subject of ongoing 
litigation challenging various manifestations of desperate prison 
conditions.24  The named petitioners claimed medical and psychological 
traumas as a result of the breakdown of basic prison functions.  But the 
manifested harms were merely symptomatic of the brute fact of 
overcrowding of the state’s prisons.  Despite prior determinations of 
unconstitutional conditions,25 California continued to incarcerate—
furthered by its punitive sentencing policies,26 including “three strikes 
 
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke”); 
Nagareda, supra note 18, at 132 (arguing that “[w]hat matters to class certification” under Rule 
23 is “the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the 
resolution of the litigation”). 
21. In its most extreme and unstable form, this minority is so localized as to be the 
problematic “class of one.”  In its most recent incarnation, this claim of equal protection disregard 
for such particularized interests divided the Seventh Circuit in Del Marcelle v. Brown County 
Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (producing a three-way split on the proper standard of review 
for class of one claims). 
22. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
23. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
24. Id. at 1922 (noting that California’s prison conditions had been the subject of “years of 
litigation”). 
25. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that state 
officials acted with deliberate indifference toward inmates’ mental health needs in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment); Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932243, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. May 10, 2005) (appointing a Receiver to supervise the prison system’s medical 
facilities after finding persistent violations of inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights).  
26. In 1977, California enacted a Determinate Sentencing Law (“DSL”), which limited 
judicial discretion and mandated higher sentences in a variety of circumstances.  1976 Cal. Stat. 
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and you’re out”27—to the point that its inmate population reached over 
150,000, housed in prisons built to hold 80,000.28  As the incarcerated 
population grew, the basic systems of health and security broke down, 
with alarming incidences of mental illness, violence, and disease.29 
The need for class treatment in Brown v. Plata may be readily 
discerned from the perspective of crafting a remedy.  Each member of 
the class had been duly sentenced and properly subject to incarceration, 
leaving aside the inevitable individual appeals and habeas proceedings 
that may have been pending.  No prisoner could claim an individual 
right to release from prison as a consequence of the overcrowding.  
Damages might be awarded for claims of severe harm, as with the 
named plaintiffs in Brown, but damage awards to prisoners are 
notoriously sparing.30  Whatever the cumulated total of damages awards 
to individual prisoners, the incentives to the state would have been to 
allow the problem to fester rather than confront the harsh consequences 
of state policy.  It was simply cheaper—economically and politically—
to pay off the worst abused prisoners in a dysfunctional system rather 
than have to confront the structural calamity of the California state 
prisons.  Absent unitary treatment through a class action, no prisoner 
would have a claim as to the systemic violations caused by 
overcrowding, but only standing to seek legal redress for his or her 
individual harms. 
 
5140 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)).  In part as a result of its more 
stringent sentencing regime, the state’s prison population increased more than sevenfold between 
1980 and 2007.  Joan Petersilla, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 
37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 209 (2008).  The Supreme Court struck down the DSL in 2007.  See 
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2007) (finding that the statute violates defendants’ 
Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial by permitting “the judge, not the jury, to find the facts 
permitting an upper term sentence”). 
27. Three Strikes Law, CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2003).  The Supreme Court has 
heretofore rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to three-strikes laws.  See, e.g., Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003) (upholding defendant’s sentence of two consecutive twenty-
five-year terms for shop lifting, his third felony offense).  But see Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 
755, 768 (9th Cir. 2004) (overturning three-strikes sentence for a third shoplifting offense as 
disproportional in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
28. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923. 
29. The record revealed appalling instances of abuse and neglect due to overcrowding. 
Suicidal inmates awaiting treatment were at times “held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth 
sized cages without toilets.”  Id. at 1924.  Inmates suffering from physical ailments likewise 
experienced prolonged delays: in one facility, “[a] prisoner with severe abdominal pain died after 
a five-week delay in referral to a specialist.”  Id. at 1925.  A doctor testified that “extreme 
departures from the standard of care were ‘widespread.’”  Id. 
30. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1626 (2003) (noting 
that even before the 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which raised the bar for recovery, 
“plaintiffs were successful in only a small minority of inmate cases filed, and even the successful 
cases usually garnered quite small damages”). 
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Further, a prisoner’s status impedes any meaningful recourse to the 
political process.  California disenfranchises convicted felons during 
their incarceration or parole, with felons constituting the substantial 
majority of the population in the state prisons.31  The inability to vote is 
really only a formality that confirms the outcast status of violent 
criminals who make up the bulk of the prison population.  On the issue 
of greatest concern to the prison population—the overcrowding and 
oppression of the prisons themselves—prisoners are unlikely to 
compete successfully for scarce state resources against schools, roads, 
parks, and the services consumed by the law-abiding, voting population.  
Moreover, prisoners face the concentrated and effective political force 
of the correction workers’ union, a powerful force that, through 
lobbying and extraordinary campaign contributions, has pressed for 
harsher sentences—a major source of overcrowding.32 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court order requiring 
the immediate reduction of the California prison population by 40,000 
inmates, until such time as its prisons hold no more than 137.5% of 
capacity.33  It is inconceivable that the paralyzed California political 
system could have mustered the will to resolve the intolerable 
conditions inside its prisons, nor is it conceivable that, absent a 
mechanism for collective redress, any meaningful legal remedy could 
have been fashioned in one-by-one litigation.  The question of class 
certification legitimately placed the Court in a role of public 
superintendent over the rights of inmates.  This, in turn, allowed the 
extraordinary and controversial remedy of ordering the release of 
prisoners duly convicted of crimes, in effect putting felons back on the 
street.34 
Viewed against the backdrop of political power, the class action in a 
case such as Brown v. Plata serves as the legitimate and efficient 
 
31. JOSEPH M. HAYES, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., CALIFORNIA’S CHANGING PRISON 
POPULATION 1 (2012), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_PrisonsJTF.pdf. 
32. The California Correctional Peace Officers Association ranked fifth among the top-ten 
contributors to independent expenditures committees between 2001 and 2006.  CAL. FAIR 
POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES FOR LEGISLATIVE AND 
STATEWIDE CANDIDATES 4 (2008), available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/meeting_slides/20080 
214/Presentation-Final.pdf.  Harsher sentencing laws are reflected in an aging prison population, 
with prisoners aged fifty years or older now comprising nineteen percent of the state’s inmates.  
HAYES, supra note 31, at 1. 
33. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1945–46. 
34. A ringing dissent by Justice Scalia described the approved remedy as “the most radical 
injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history.”  Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  The District Court permitted the State to devise its own plan to reduce overcrowding 
within two years.  Id. at 1943.  Pending appeal, California initiated a program to transfer 
“thousands” of prisoners to county jails.  Id.  
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mobilizing device for statutory or constitutional challenges to public 
authorities, particularly on behalf of those who have no effective 
prospect of political mobilization to correct untoward public behavior. 
II. THE CLASS ACTION AS A COMPLEMENT TO STATE AUTHORITY 
Unlike the origins of Rule 23(b)(2) as a form of channeling and 
legitimating challenges to governmental authority, the need for judicial 
efficiency in the prosecution of related claims for recompense prompted 
the 1966 innovation of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action.35  As with all 
public goods, the more diffuse the related interests become, the more 
likely there will be insufficient investment to secure common benefits.36  
Here again, the class action needs to confront the role of the state as the 
primary guarantor of public goods.  A key justification of public 
ordering is the risk of underproduction of undifferentiated, commonly 
utilized goods, such as national defense, environmental protection, 
maintenance of water quality, and a host of goods that are difficult to 
underwrite through private user fees.  The state, through its common 
capacity to pool costs and benefits through the taxing and regulatory 
power, is the prime mechanism to overcome the “tragedy of the 
commons”37 that leads to suboptimal societal results. 
Class actions address the public goods dilemma in two ways.  First, 
by pooling the stakes in the case, the class action balances the incentives 
for investment in litigation between a repeat-play defendant and a host 
of one-time actors, as with the relation between a mass marketer and an 
undifferentiated group of individual consumers.  While the mass 
producer of goods or services can amortize the cost of defense across 
numerous transactions, the sheer cost and bother of pursuing claims 
over a single consumer transaction will deter any rational actor from 
seeking legal redress.  To quote Judge Richard Posner, “only a lunatic 
or a fanatic sues for $30.”38  Indeed, overcoming the “negative value” 
 
35. On the history of Rule 23(b)(3), see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and 
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 669–70 
(1979) (arguing that the 1966 revisions to Rule 23(b)(3) were not intended to revolutionize class-
action practice, but merely to create “a more effective procedural tool”); John K. Rabiej, The 
Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 335–36 
(2005) (emphasizing that considerations of efficiency and access shaped modern Rule 23(b)(3)).  
See also William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why It Matters, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2146–49 (2004) (arguing that Rule 23(b)(3) permits class action 
plaintiffs to supplement public regulation by acting as “private attorneys general”). 
36. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
387, 388 (1954) (explaining the “pure theory of government expenditure” on collective 
consumption goods).  
37. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 (1968). 
38. Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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associated with seeking relief is offered as one of the prime 
justifications for the small-value class action.39  Second, pooling claims 
creates a common reservoir of recovery that may induce an agent to take 
the reins on behalf of the class.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged 
this, stating: 
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to 
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the 
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or 
her rights.  A class action solves this problem by aggregating the 
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s 
(usually an attorney’s) labor.40 
The modern form of the class action subsidizes private attorneys in 
overcoming these collective action barriers.41  Common fund recoveries 
are an important inducement for entrepreneurial attorneys to seek out 
promising cases and invest in them accordingly.  Also, the 
characteristically American form of the opt-out class action further 
reduces the transaction costs of prosecuting on behalf of a large, diffuse 
group.  Under Rule 23(c), reasonable efforts must be made to provide 
notice of the action to the affected population.42  But the burden of 
exclusion falls on the class members who will be bound unless 
affirmatively choosing to opt out.  As a result, class representatives and, 
more significantly, class attorneys are spared the expense of having to 
attempt to contract on a one-by-one basis with all class members—a 
costly effect of an opt-in system of representation. 
If the state is to subsidize private actors to assume the role of public 
agents—what the law describes as the private attorney general 
model43—then why should the state not assume the role of public 
guardian itself?  Access to justice is itself a costly public good and the 
availability of relatively low-cost, private attorney general actions 
depends on the infrastructure of courts, liberal discovery, and the 
enforceability of judgments.  In many areas of law, the subsidy provided 
by the opt-out class action is sufficient to induce private action that 
either makes further investment in public enforcement an unnecessary 
 
39. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The most compelling 
rationale for finding superiority in a class action [is] the existence of a negative value suit.”). 
40. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru 
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
41. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and 
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 
2145–47 (2000) (arguing that modern class action rules help subsidize private enforcement of 
public interests). 
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).  
43. See generally Rubenstein, supra note 35 (explaining the role of private attorney generals 
in class action suits).  
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public expenditure or proves to be more efficient in ferreting out 
wrongdoing that directs public administrative action. 
The result is a form of public-private collaboration in which the 
private class action augments public administration of the laws.  
Antitrust law provides the best example.  The broad channel of antitrust 
actions begins as public enforcements, either civil or criminal, brought 
by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice.44  
Typically, these cases seek injunctive relief, sometimes civil fines or 
criminal penalties, but almost never restitution or compensation to the 
victims of unlawful action.  Instead, that task is left to private 
enforcement through the “private attorney general” actions brought by 
private lawyers challenging the consequences of the anticompetitive 
activity and seeking recovery for the class.  Notably, one of the more 
notorious of recent antitrust cases set the stage for the elevation of 
pleading standards beyond the long established “notice pleading” 
requirement for initiating a civil lawsuit.45  In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, the Supreme Court began the modern trend toward 
heightened pleading requirements that satisfy a plausibility standard of 
initial judicial scrutiny.46  For present purposes, it is worth noting only 
that Twombly was among the subset of antitrust class actions in which 
private parties sought to both establish the liability for the underlying 
conduct and recover for the damages.  The Supreme Court upheld a 
dismissal for failure to state a plausible claim, something that would be 
extremely hard to imagine if there had been a prior public prosecution 
or civil action resulting in a finding of liability. 
Although less of a cooperative venture, a similar overlap of private 
and public enforcement appears in the securities fraud context.  One 
study by Professor Howell Jackson found that between 2002 and 2004, 
 
44. See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 
21 (2007) (noting that private plaintiffs “may be able to benefit from the discovery the 
government collected” and that “potential plaintiffs often lobby the government agencies to bring 
the cases first”).  An earlier study found that between 1973 and 1983, nearly a quarter of all 
private claims were filed as “follow-on” cases to government enforcement actions.  Thomas E. 
Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, Private Antitrust Cases that Follow on Government Cases, in 
PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 329, 358 (Lawrence J. White 
ed., 1988). 
45. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be dismissed 
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double 
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 19 (2010) (arguing that Twombly 
“transformed the function of a complaint . . . by imposing a more demanding standard that 
requires a greater factual foundation than previously was required or originally intended”).   
46. See 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2006) (holding that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 
must plead sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”).  
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private class actions accounted for nearly forty percent of all sanctions 
imposed on securities fraud defendants, despite overlapping jurisdiction 
between private and public actions.47  In light of the most recent wave 
of financial dislocations, renewed attention has turned to the perceived 
insufficiencies of private enforcement to deter misconduct.48  As well- 
summarized by Harvey Goldschmidt, former Commissioner of the SEC: 
“Private enforcement is a necessary supplement to the work that the 
[SEC] does.  It is also a safety valve against the potential capture of the 
agency by industry.”49 
Though the symbiotic relationship between public and private 
enforcement is less apparent than in the antitrust context, private 
securities fraud claims benefit from a strong doctrinal cost-savings 
boost.  All fraud cases require, as an element of proof of harm, evidence 
that the purchaser relied on the deception that constitutes the fraud—
overt in the form of a misrepresentation or covert in the form of an 
omission of critical information—in making the decision that led to her 
losses.  The best evidence of such detrimental reliance is the testimony 
of the purchaser herself (even if it is prone to be self-serving after the 
fact), especially in omission cases where the individual claim of reliance 
constitutes a counterfactual about what would have happened under 
untested circumstances. 
The need for such direct testimony of fraud would doom all class 
actions by eliminating the efficiency gains of common prosecution and 
restoring all the transactional obstacles to small-value prosecutions.50  
But such an inherited conception of common law fraud would presume 
that modern capital markets operate as nothing more than an extended 
series of contractual exchanges between individual buyers and sellers, 
rendering the New York Stock Exchange an elaborate bazaar where 
individual buyers and sellers haggle over the price of a putatively 
antique rug. 
Modern finance theory, not to mention common sense, casts a 
 
47. See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary 
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 280–81 (2007) (graphing U.S. 
securities regulation enforcement actions in terms of both public and private actions).  
48. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence 
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536–38 (2006) (arguing that a greater share 
of liability must be assigned to corporate managers and directors in order to achieve optimal 
deterrence from securities class actions). 
49. Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2006, 
at A1. 
50. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class Actions, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1648 (2000) (“The modern securities class action would be impossible if such 
reliance needed to be established on an individual basis . . . .”). 
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skeptical account on this rendering of rapid-fire capital markets.  In its 
place, one may presume that “thick markets,” ones in which the traded 
securities are fully fungible and the buyers and sellers are unknown to 
each other, are “efficient” in the sense that transactions occur at the 
market clearing price and not as a result of the exchange of private 
communication among the transacting parties.51  This is the “efficient 
capital market hypothesis,” which posits that in thick and efficient 
markets, all publicly available information will be incorporated into the 
price of a stock.  This then allows securities claims to be based on a 
fraud on the market theory that presumes that all transactions are 
affected by the market incorporation of material information that the 
seller delivers to the market, as with improper claims in a prospectus or 
misleading representations in public filings.52 
The ability to prove fraud through market activity has a direct bearing 
on the prospect for private enforcement, in effect relieving private 
actions of the transactional burden of establishing reliance through the 
costly common law method of individual proof.53  The substantive 
law’s recognition of the efficiency gains realized by institutional actors 
in thick capital markets is then matched by a procedural tool that 
overcomes the collective action barrier to investors seeking redress in 
parallel efficient fashion.  Once relieved of the burden of showing 
individually specific reliance in each transaction, the purchasers of 
shares during a fixed period of time become interchangeable parts of a 
market complex, differentiated not by their individual decision making, 
but by the mechanical facts of the prices at which they bought or sold. 
As summarized last Term by Chief Justice Roberts in Erica P. John 
Fund v. Halliburton Co.: “Because the market ‘transmits information to 
the investor in the processed form of a market price,’ we can assume . . . 
 
51. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 
25 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970) (“[I]n an efficient market prices ‘fully reflect’ available information.”); 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 567 (1984) (surveying the literature on the efficient capital market hypothesis and 
identifying the mechanisms through which information may be incorporated into the market 
price). 
52. See Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving 
Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (1982) (“Because the market is efficient, 
investors who rely on a market price that is artificially inflated or depressed by fraudulent conduct 
suffer an economic loss.”).  One of the earliest formulations of the fraud on the market theory in a 
securities class action appears in Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(permitting class certification without individualized proof of loss causation on the ground that 
“proof of subjective reliance on particular misrepresentations is unnecessary to establish a 10b-5 
claim for a deception inflating the price of stock traded in the open market”). 
53. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 223, 245 (1988) (“Requiring a plaintiff to show . . . 
how he would have acted if omitted material information had been disclosed . . . would [impose] 
an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden.”). 
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that an investor relies on public misstatements whenever ‘he buys or 
sells stock at the price set by the market.’”54  In Halliburton, the Court 
permitted investors to organize collectively as an opt-out class without 
first proving that each individual investor’s losses from the decline in 
stock prices resulted from the defendant’s misrepresentations, precisely 
because such a requirement would have reduced market-based 
collective claims to a series of individual exchanges.55  The result 
overturned an emerging trend in some lower courts that required 
investors to prove loss causation in order to take advantage of the fraud 
on the market presumption, thereby maintaining the economic viability 
of private enforcement actions.  
The antitrust and securities cases lie across a spectrum of 
complementary public-private enforcement actions in which cost-
effective class action mechanisms buttress the limited collective 
resources available to the state.  The spectrum includes arrangements 
whereby the state agency serves as the initial clearinghouse for 
collective prosecution, permitting private actions only after state 
authorities have decided not to sue directly, as with the screening role of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII.56  
Each setting offers a distinct, unique hybrid of public and private 
enforcement, each organized to overcome the collective action barrier to 
private individuals seeking redress on their own.57  The public 
dimension uses the forced collective action of the state; the private 
dimension uses the voluntary private aggregation made possible by 
liberal class action rules. 
III. THE CLASS ACTION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR 
DIRECT STATE AUTHORITY 
At the furthest remove from the idea of exclusive state regulatory 
authority is the use of the class action as a form of regulatory authority 
designed to be relatively independent of formal state administration.  
 
54. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011) (quoting  
Levinson, 485 U.S. at 244). 
55. Id. at 2183. 
56. A party wishing to file a discrimination claim under Title VII must first file a claim with 
the EEOC, which conducts an initial investigation.  If the EEOC determines there is “reasonable 
cause to believe the charge is true,” it may file a claim on the party’s behalf or issue a right to sue 
letter permitting the party to pursue her claim in court.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)–(f) (2006). 
57. It is possible to extend the spectrum beyond the class action mechanism to include qui tam 
actions in which the private recovery of relators allows even individuals to assume collective 
responsibility for pursuing public harms.  See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States 
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773–74 (2000) (noting “the long tradition of qui tam actions in 
England and the American Colonies,” and affirming relator’s standing to bring suit based on 
injury to the United States). 
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While no private action operates truly independent of the state—the 
locus is courts and private enforcement of legal norms—what is critical 
in this domain is that the moving agent regarding any particular claim of 
harm is a private actor rather than a state regulator or prosecutor.  Such 
private enforcement is particularly alluring in common law systems that 
depend on ex-post liability to police market activity, as opposed to more 
rigid regulatory review as a condition of market entry.58 
Once after-the-fact civil liability becomes a major source of 
regulatory oversight, there is no necessary reason for the state to be the 
lead enforcement agent.  In responding to discrete injuries, the active 
agents can easily be private actors representing claimants for alleged 
misconduct that may emerge as the driving force in both establishing 
liability and obtaining relief.59  Indeed, in describing the trend in 
Europe toward greater avenues of aggregate litigation, Fabrizio Cafaggi 
and Hans Micklitz specifically tie the role of collective litigation to 
different regulatory strategies: “Shifting enforcement from ex ante to ex 
post may permit entry liberalization, leaving pre-market authorization 
only for specific and riskier products or services.”60 
Thus, the class action in many areas of law is the private alternative 
to government enforcement; that is, the mechanism that allows the 
flexibility of the common law to operate instead of more formal 
command and control regulation.  Private enforcement mechanisms play 
a role in the operation of what may be termed “regulating after the fact,” 
the system of ex-post accountability that is the hallmark of the common 
law.  The expansive role of civil litigation in the U.S., contrasted with 
greater formal regulation in much of the developed economic world, is 
part and parcel of a commitment of private regulatory enforcement.61  
 
58. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating after the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377–78 
(2007) (emphasizing the “centrality of ex post regulation” in the American legal system). 
59. Ex-ante regulation is most effective when potential harms are predictable and precautions 
easily ascertained.  Enforcement through ex-post liability is better suited to circumstances where 
potential harms are variable or available precautions uncertain.  See Samuel Issacharoff & Ian 
Samuel, The Institutional Dimension of Consumer Protection, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 47, 50–53 
(Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz eds., 2009) (proposing a typology to explain the 
relationship between public and private, and ex-post and ex-ante, regulation). 
60. Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz, Introduction, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION, supra note 59, at 1, 8. 
61. Richard L. Marcus, Reform through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 901, 907 (2002), 
http://lawreview.wustl.edu/inprint/80-3/p901Marcusbookpages.pdf (“[T]he American tendency to 
litigate about topics that are handled without litigation in other societies is not pathological, but 
rather a logical consequence of the American method of providing activist government without a 
centralized bureaucracy.  On the positive side, it can provide remarkable protections on the 
initiative of a few, including the dispossessed; those who champion the remedial potential of 
adversary legalism are right.”). 
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In important areas of consumer law and economic damages, as with 
securities fraud, the private class action overcomes the distinct 
disabilities of public enforcement: the problem of insufficient resources, 
the risk of regulatory capture, and the proclivity toward rigidity of 
formal regulation in markets that require innovation and speed of 
change.62 
The difference between a fixed, preexisting consumer organization or 
other state-licensed enterprise and the flexible use of the class action 
reflects long-standing divisions in economic organization.  If we go 
back one thousand years to the rise of Venice as a major trading power, 
one sees the importance of single-venture economic organizations to 
capitalize on entrepreneurial initiative and harness active agents to the 
needs of more passive principals.  As told in the compelling account by 
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Venice pioneered the use of the 
commenda, “a rudimentary type of joint stock company, which formed 
only for the duration of a single trading mission.”63  A commenda 
“involved two partners, a ‘sedentary’ one who stayed in Venice and one 
who traveled.  The sedentary partner put capital into the venture, while 
the traveling partner accompanied the cargo.”64  Acemoglu and 
Robinson praise the commenda for unleashing new uses of investment 
capital and for preventing the stultifying effects of permanent state 
monopolies on trade or enterprise.65  
One can find many parallels between the single-undertaking joint 
ventures of old and the modern class action as developed in the U.S.  
Unlike the fixed creation of a government agency, or even the licensing 
of a single actor such as a designated consumer organization or some 
other NGO, the class action is transactionally limited.  It exists for the 
limited purpose of pursuing a common set of claims among people who 
typically have no prior and no subsequent relation to each other.  The 
result is mutually beneficial temporary alliances, as with the commenda, 
but with no institutional permanence beyond the single undertaking. 
The class action fits well in American law precisely because of its 
separation from formal state control.  In part, the centrality of class 
actions in areas such as consumer protection reflects a generalized 
 
62. Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S. 
Experience, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 137–42 (1999). 
63. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF 
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 152 (2012). 
64. Id. at 152–53. 
65. Id. at 153.  Acemoglu and Robinson attribute the atrophying of Venice in part to the 
elimination of flexible economic organizations, such as the commenda, in favor of fixed state 
licenses, a process that promoted capture by established economic actors and that in turn led to 
economic stagnation.  Id. at 153–56. 
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common law approach to incremental regulation through evolving 
standards of care, similar to the growth of product liability law in the 
twentieth century.66  The class action is a procedural device that 
responds to two obstacles that may frustrate the proper functioning of 
common law accountability.  First, as already discussed, the prospect of 
collective prosecution serves as a litigation-inducing device through the 
coordination of small-value claims.  Not only does it make collective 
prosecution possible, but it also allows for potential complete resolution 
of all claims, thereby saving on the transaction costs of repeat litigation 
and offering the prospect of a “global peace”67 premium in exchange 
for a complete release of all claims against defendants.68  Second, 
following the 1966 reforms to Rule 23, class actions proved particularly 
well suited to economic harm claims arising from impersonal markets 
for mass produced goods and services.  In so doing, class actions 
bridged a critical gap between limited contractual remedies for the mass 
of affected consumers and the redress available to the subset of 
claimants whose physical injuries would place them within the reach of 
tort law, as in pharmaceutical cases.69 
But focusing only on the litigation features of the class action would 
understate the major feature of private litigation in mass markets.  
Returning to President Lorenzetti’s initial account of the role of the 
class action, what stands out in this form of private action is the 
introduction of multiple actors into legal enforcement, a form of 
regulatory pluralism.  This role is captured in part by the account of 
 
66. For a discussion on the evolution of products liability, see MARK A. GEISTFELD, 
PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 9–26 (2006); William Powers, Jr., Is There a Doctrinal 
Answer to the Question of Generic Liability?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 169, 172–73 (1996) (noting 
that section 402a of the Restatement of Torts paved the ground for modern products liability law 
through its case-by-case adoption). 
67. See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 310 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]ere we to mandate 
that a class include only those alleging ‘colorable’ claims, we would effectively rule out the 
ability of a defendant to achieve ‘global peace’ by obtaining releases from all those who might 
wish to assert claims, meritorious or not.”). 
68. In this sense, class action settlements overcome not only the commons problem of public 
goods, but the negative commons problem arising from the inability to coordinate fractionated 
interests in a common asset.   For an incisive discussion of this element of the “peace premium” 
in class resolution of common claims, see D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in 
Non-Class Aggregate Settlements 7–9 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-42, June 28, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2122877 (noting that “defendants are sometimes willing to pay a 
premium for total peace” to avoid adverse selection effects, reduce uncertainty, and minimize 
transaction costs). 
69. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.01 (2010) 
(noting that class actions may be more effective in addressing “economic injuries from a 
generally applicable course of conduct” than “personal injuries” where common issues are 
generally not as prevalent).  
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class action plaintiffs as private attorneys general.  However, the private 
attorney general model is limited in implying that the only role of the 
class action suit is to fill the gap for lack of public resources.  Offering a 
rival actor who can challenge regulatory failure is not simply a response 
to the benign fact of constrained capacity, but represents a deeper 
concern about the misdirection of public resources. 
Class actions then play a central regulatory role because of their 
independence from formal state channels.  From this perspective, the 
purpose of the class action is to be a rival to the enforcement powers of 
state actors so as to serve as a check on the misuse of public authority.  
Mass markets are prone to the concentrated interests of the repeat actor 
overwhelming the diffuse interests of small-time actors.  The effect is 
not just a matter of different litigation incentives, but of the 
disproportionate political pressure that concentrated minorities are 
likely to exert.70  On this view, private suit enforcement through a class 
action is not just a matter of equalizing litigation resources.  Rather, the 
critical issue is having diverse sources of oversight of markets with 
asymmetric stakes between engaged repeat actors and passive 
consumers.  The greater the number of potential regulatory enforcement 
agents, the less likely the prospect of the regulator being captured by the 
superior resources and incentives of the regulated.  The trade-off, 
however, is that there is less public accountability to the form of 
regulatory enforcement, and that the extent of regulation is largely 
determined by the economic incentives facing private actors, rather than 
the formalities of political decision making. 
This potential for the class action to serve as an enforcement device 
independent of state authorities is the feature of class action law that is 
most likely to engender strenuous opposition from institutional actors.  
Any mass marketer of goods or services would rather face the limited 
resources and attention of the individual consumer, whether in the 
limited domain of one-on-one dispute resolution, or even in the political 
arena.  To speak of class actions as “leveling the playing field”71 is not 
 
70. This is the classic public choice account of why minority factions can extract 
disproportionate returns from the political process.  For an early formulation of public choice 
theory, see WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962).  On the superior 
ability of organized minorities to advance their interests, see MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 143 (1965) (“The multitude 
of workers, consumers, white-collar workers, farmers, and so on are organized only in special 
circumstances, but business interests are organized as a general rule.”).  For a comprehensive 
overview of the public choice literature, see Steven Croley, Interest Groups and Public Choice, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 49, 49–80 (Daniel A. Farber & 
Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). 
71. See Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, WASH U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 13) (on file with author). 
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only a matter of balancing the strengths of the relative litigation 
interests but of the deeper concern that absent some form of 
independent collective redress, wrongdoing will likely go undetected 
and unchallenged. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the most important battles of 
current class action case law in the U.S. are being waged in the domain 
where the class action is a primary mechanism of independent challenge 
to mass-scale wrongdoing.  This is the issue of moment in the domain 
of consumer law, where the asymmetries of scale between mass 
marketers and individuals allow the former to control standard form 
contracting.  Across a range of services, such as cell phones and credit 
cards, and increasingly in the employment context, standard form 
contracts now prohibit the accepting party from seeking redress as part 
of a class action and force any individual dispute into individual 
arbitrations.72 
The leading cases in this area, most notably AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,73 turn on the preemptive force of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) in preventing state law interference with the effort to disable 
private enforcement.74  So long as the consumer contracts are generated 
in a state that recognizes the enforceability of such waivers, the FAA 
then serves to preclude any other state remedies.75  Some cases, with 
Concepcion again the most notable, have looked to the practical 
 
72. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 379 (2005) (predicting that collective action 
waivers, if permitted to proliferate, will ultimately result in “the near-total demise of the modern 
class action.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1638–39 (2005) (noting the ubiquity of mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts of 
adhesion); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at 62–63), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038985 (describing collective 
action waivers as a substantial impediment to negative value class action suits).  
73. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts 
California’s common law unconscionability rule barring class action waivers in contracts of 
adhesion). 
74. Two earlier cases both involved contracts that were silent on the question of class-wide 
arbitration.  In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, a plurality of justices held that the FAA 
empowers the arbitrator—not the state court—to determine whether a contract may be read as 
permitting class-wide arbitration.  539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).  The Supreme Court went a step 
further in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., concluding that “a party may not be 
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis,” 
thereby superseding the background rules of individual states.  130 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 (2010).  See 
also Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 347–48 (2008) (finding that the FAA preempts a California 
state law requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to arbitration). 
75. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (emphasizing that 
“[s]tates may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law 
principles” but “[may not] place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing’”).  
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effectiveness of the arbitration forum.76  But this is the exception, and 
the grant of strong preemptive power to the FAA has given the 
requirement of private arbitration the imprimatur of the supremacy of 
federal law. 
To date, most efforts to resist mandatory arbitration have fallen into 
the trap of asking whether the quality of the underlying consumer 
agreement as a contract of adhesion made the terms unconscionable.77  
The individualist premise of the unconscionability doctrine does not 
engage the regulatory role played by class actions in areas of law poorly 
overseen by state authorities.  Indeed, only a handful of cases have 
addressed the legal enforceability of compelled individual arbitration in 
terms of the effectiveness of the overall regulatory scheme, primarily in 
the context of federal law where the state-federal issues of the FAA do 
not obtain.78 
At present, it is precisely where public enforcement is difficult, 
compromised, captured, or under-resourced that the flexibility and the 
entrepreneurial drive behind the class action are most decisive and most 
significant.  And, not surprisingly, it is there that the political economy 
 
76. The contract at issue in Concepcion specified that AT&T would “pay all costs for non-
frivolous claims”; guaranteed a minimum recovery of $7,500 plus double attorney fees should the 
final award exceed AT&T’s settlement offer; and permitted plaintiffs to choose whether to 
arbitrate “in person, by telephone, or based only on submissions.”  Owing to these generous 
terms, the Supreme Court observed that “consumers who were members of a class would likely 
be worse off.”  131 S. Ct. at 1744–45.  But see In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 
218 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that a class action waiver could not be enforced because the costs of 
individual arbitration would effectively preclude plaintiffs from bringing their antitrust claims), 
cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 2012 WL 3096737 (U.S. Nov. 9, 
2012) (No. 12-133).  
77. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (holding that 
class action waivers in contracts of adhesion are unconscionable in circumstances where “the 
party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large 
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money”), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. at 1753. 
78. The leading example is the Second Circuit’s decision in a federal antitrust action.  See In 
re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 2012 WL 3096737 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-133).  The court 
specifically found that a successful antitrust action would require expenditures approaching one 
million dollars just for the expert econometrics necessary to prosecute any claim, something that 
no individual litigant would ever rationally pursue in arbitration or any other individual case.  Id. 
at 217–18.  By contrast, in CompuCredit, the Supreme Court upheld a class action waiver in the 
face of what appeared to be a statutory commitment to the availability of full court protection.  
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669–70 (2012) (holding that a provision of the 
Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA) mandating disclosure of consumers’ “right to sue” does 
not preclude enforcement of a mandatory arbitration clause).  Only Justice Ginsburg argued the 
importance of private enforcement to effectuate the statutory scheme.  See id. at 678 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s decision reduces plaintiffs’ right to sue to a far less 
meaningful right “to seek, or defend against, court enforcement of an award rendered by the 
arbitrator chosen by the credit repair organization”). 
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of resistance by institutional actors is most acute.  The most contested 
arena of class action law is where the private enforcement action 
substitutes for or displaces public enforcement for reasons that are not 
difficult to divine.  That fact alone speaks to the importance and 
complexity of private class action law. 
CONCLUSION 
At the heart of the modern class action is the creation of a private 
form of collective authority standing relatively independent of the state.  
The independence can yield an effective mechanism to challenge state 
conduct, to assist the state without swelling the permanent ranks of 
enforcement administration, and even to police potential misconduct by 
state actors vested with exclusive enforcement authority.  As ably 
summarized by Judge Scirica of the Third Circuit: 
The class action device and the concept of the private attorney general 
are powerful instruments of social and economic policy.  Despite 
inherent tensions, they have proven efficacious in resolving mass 
claims when courts have insisted on structural, procedural, and 
substantive fairness.  Among the goals are redress of injuries, 
procedural due process, efficiency, horizontal equity among injured 
claimants, and finality.79 
Part of the allure of class actions is that they can offer these benefits 
more flexibly and often more efficiently than can the state.  That raises 
the question, particularly as more civil law countries are experimenting 
with private enforcement, of their relation to the traditional reliance on 
direct state regulatory authority.  The promised benefits correspond to a 
deeper commitment to regulatory pluralism, one that recognizes not 
only the gains that might be realized through private enforcement, but 
the risks associated with excessive reliance on exclusive state regulatory 
power.80 
 
79. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 340 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring). 
80. My colleague Arthur Miller powerfully makes the point about the deregulatory impulse 
behind the private attorney general model: 
Even though private lawsuits might be viewed as an inefficient ex post method of 
enforcing public policies, they have dispersed regulatory authority; achieved greater 
transparency; provided a source of compensation, deterrence, and institutional 
governance; and led to leaner government involvement.  Without this private-
attorneys-general concept, the substitution of an alternative methodology would be 
necessary.  This probably would mean the establishment of the type of continental-
style, centralized bureaucracies and administrative enforcement that many think are 
inconsistent with our culture and heritage. 
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal, supra note 45, at 6. 
